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Article
Introduction
In recent years, the science-driven topic of climate change 
has emerged as one of the most politically divided issues in 
surveys of U.S. public opinion (Hamilton, 2014). Its corre-
lations with ideology and political party are strong enough 
to make ideology, party, and climate change opinions look 
like three equally valid indicators for the same underlying 
dimension (Kahan, 2015). This has not always been true, of 
course; a generation ago, ideology and party had much the 
same meaning as today, while anthropogenic climate change 
was barely on the public horizon. A countermovement 
opposing regulations enacted with bipartisan support in the 
1970s helped transform environment protection generally, 
and later climate change in particular, into highly partisan 
issues (Jacques, Dunlap, & Freeman, 2008; McCright & 
Dunlap, 2011; McCright, Xiao, & Dunlap, 2014). Scientists 
whose research detects environmental problems, or anthro-
pogenic climate change, also are seen in an increasingly 
polarized light.
Across major science topics including not only climate 
change but also evolution, age of the earth, environmental 
and health impacts of industrial activities, or biomedical 
research on stem cells and AIDS, conservative leaders have 
taken positions at odds with a scientific consensus. Leadership 
and media personality declarations that evolution and anthro-
pogenic climate change are hoaxes, along with concerted 
efforts to rewrite high school science textbooks, restrict sci-
ence at the Environmental Protection Agency (Kollipara, 
2014) and National Science Foundation (Mervis, 2014), and 
defund earth research by the National Aeronautics and Space 
Administration (Samenow, 2015; Timmer, 2015) provide tan-
gible signs of a partisan “war on science,” with support attrib-
uted to economic, ideological, religious, and cognitive 
differences (Mooney, 2005, 2012) or simply to culture 
(Kahan, 2015). Gauchat (2012) track General Social Survey 
(GSS) responses to a question on confidence in “the Scientific 
Community” from 1974 to 2010, finding that “conservatives 
began the period with the highest trust in science, relative to 
liberals and moderates, and ended the period with the lowest” 
(p. 167). He considers historical and political origins for the 
political divide on science, an area further explored by studies 
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including Jacques et al. (2008) and Brulle, Carmichael, and 
Jenkins (2012).
Claims of a broad conservative distrust of science have 
been countered by assertions that while conservatives might 
oppose the scientific consensus on climate change or evolu-
tion, liberals oppose scientists on some other core domains, 
notably vaccines. Opposition to vaccination among the U.S. 
public has been a potent force with potentially disastrous 
consequences (Kirkland, 2012; Lillvis, Kirkland, & Frick, 
2014; Omer, Salmon, Orenstein, deHart, & Halsey, 2009; 
Parikh, 2008). A number of commentators have depicted 
vaccine opposition as primarily a liberal folly, comparable in 
seriousness and scale to the conservative rejection of climate 
science (e.g., Berezow, 2014; Hoskinson, 2014; O’Neil, 
2014).
In this article, we test the proposition of opposite bias 
using data from two regional surveys conducted in 2014. 
Both surveys carried a pair of questions asking respondents 
whether they trust scientists for information about climate 
change or vaccines. Our analysis follows the approach taken 
in research on “the social bases of environmental concern,” a 
substantial literature (since Van Liere & Dunlap, 1980) 
exploring individual demographic and ideological character-
istics as predictors of survey responses on environment-
related questions, including trust in environmental scientists 
(Hamilton & Saito, 2015). Age, gender, education, and polit-
ical effects have been widely replicated. The social-bases 
approach adapts well to our goal of comparing people who 
say they trust scientists on climate change and vaccines. Are 
these opposite or overlapping groups?
Vaccine Safety Concerns
Vaccine effectiveness and safety have been important topics 
of medical research. One 1998 paper asserting a connection 
between vaccinations and pervasive developmental disor-
ders (Wakefield et al., 1998) sparked widespread alarm. 
Other researchers, however, found no support for this con-
nection, and the Wakefield paper itself was subsequently 
retracted and debunked as a fraud. Public concern about 
hypothetical links between vaccination and autism neverthe-
less remains prominent (Kirkland, 2012). A large-scale 
review of research on the adverse effects of vaccines, con-
ducted by an Institute of Medicine (IOM, 2012) panel for the 
National Academy of Sciences, concluded that the weight of 
evidence clearly favors rejection of the hypothesized rela-
tionship between measles-mumps-rubella (MMR) vaccine 
and autism. Some other hypothesized effects are also 
rejected, including MMR and type I diabetes, and inactivated 
influenza vaccine and asthma. But not all adverse effects are 
discounted. The IOM review concluded that evidence con-
vincingly supports several causal relationships involving the 
live varicella zoster vaccine, is suggestive though not con-
vincing regarding some other possible connections, and data 
are too sparse to reach conclusions about still others that 
involve rare events. Susceptibility to side effects also may be 
higher in certain subgroups such as individuals with compro-
mised immune systems. Vaccination preparation and prac-
tices have changed in response to research even when 
findings were not conclusive, as in the precautionary removal 
of a mercury-based preservative from infant vaccinations by 
2001. Vaccine benefits are subject to ongoing research; for 
example, one recent study identified mechanisms by which 
measles vaccination prevents other infectious diseases 
(Mina, Metcalf, de Swart, Osterhaus, & Grenfell, 2015).
Research findings such as the lack of an MMR/autism 
link leave many vaccine opponents un-persuaded. Surveys 
and focus groups find parents may distrust government agen-
cies and medical professionals (Raithatha, Holland, Gerrard, 
& Harvey, 2003), and base their vaccination decisions on 
personal experience and advice from family members rather 
than scientific concepts and evidence (Leask, Chapman, 
Hawe, & Burgess, 2006; Nicholson & Leask, 2012). Brown 
et al. (2012, p. 1855) study a group of parents doubtful about 
MMR vaccine and suggest that the shrinking core of parents 
now rejecting MMR consists mainly of those with “more 
extreme and complex anti-immunization views.” Such views 
are supported by anti-vaccination websites, where Kata 
(2012) describes a postmodern perspective that “evidence-
based advice from qualified vaccine experts becomes just 
another opinion among many” (p. 3779). Blume (2006) cau-
tions against seeing resistance to vaccination as a social 
movement that “shares the radical ideology and disruptive 
practices commonly associated with other familiar ‘move-
ments’ (the women’s movement, the student movement, the 
environmental movement)” (p. 630). Instead he argues that 
this framing diverts attention from a potentially disruptive 
critique of vaccination practices by parents.
Is this critique disproportionately liberal? Pro- and anti-
vaccination arguments can be framed as a clash of ideals 
between health benefits for the majority of the population, 
and individual rights and responsibility to decide what is best 
for one’s children. Individual rights or judgment have both 
liberal and conservative appeal. The idea that chemicals 
found in vaccines might be dangerous seems resonant with 
liberal environmental concerns, and distrust of “Big Pharma” 
pharmaceutical companies fits with some liberal attitudes as 
well. Doubts about Western medicine more generally are 
prominent among New Age beliefs (Houtman & Aupers, 
2007), which attract more liberals than conservatives 
(Raschke, 1996). Evidence supporting an alleged liberal bias 
against vaccination has been largely anecdotal, however, 
based on arguments from regional stereotypes or celebrity 
statements (Berezow, 2014; Hoskinson, 2014; O’Neil 2014). 
Mooney (2012) responds with counter-anecdotes of liberals 
castigating other liberals for taking an unscientific stance 
against vaccines. Systematic research finds mixed or no evi-
dence for a widespread liberal bias against vaccines (Kahan, 
2014; Lewandowsky, Gignac, & Oberauer, 2013). One 2009 
poll found that Democrats were less likely than Republicans 
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to believe that news media were exaggerating the dangers of 
swine flu and more likely to say they would get the vaccina-
tion themselves (Pew, 2009). Another survey found higher 
confidence among Democrats that the schedule of vaccines 
recommended by the Department of Health and Human 
Services is safe (Berinsky, 2012). In the specific case of the 
human papillomavirus (HPV) vaccine, conservatives have 
led strong opposition with the argument that reducing danger 
from this virus will lead to increased sexual activity by young 
women (Bernat, Harpin, Eisenberg, Bearinger, & Resnick, 
2009; Reitera, McRee, Kadis, & Brewer, 2011).
Our focus in this article is not on vaccine safety, as studied 
by scientists such as those cited in the IOM (2012) review. 
Nor do we directly examine anti-vaccination beliefs. Rather, 
we focus on more general public perceptions of science. Can 
scientists be trusted for information about vaccines? If not, 
one presumably harbors doubt about the institutions, indi-
viduals, or processes of science itself, and deems other 
sources more plausible. Then scientific conclusions against 
adverse effects are not reassuring, and suspicion could gen-
eralize to different vaccines and other topics.
Divisions on Science, Climate, and 
Vaccines
The current wide political divisions across many areas of sci-
ence seem a stark contrast to reports from post-Sputnik 
America, where 92% believed that “science is making our 
lives healthier, easier, and more comfortable” (Withey, 1959, 
p. 387). Divisions today are especially pronounced regarding 
anthropogenic climate change, where people who reject its 
reality also tend not to trust scientists on this topic. 
Consequently, survey responses on climate beliefs and trust in 
climate scientists correlate with each other and have similar 
background predictors. That finding has been subject to differ-
ing interpretations, however. Is general distrust in science a 
causal factor influencing people not to believe that anthropo-
genic climate change is problematic (Hmielowski, Feldman, 
Myers, Leiserowitz, & Maibach, 2014)? Alternatively, is cli-
mate change rejected for other reasons (Antonio & Brulle, 
2011; Campbell & Kay, 2014; McCright & Dunlap, 2010, 
2011), and that rejection then spread to climate scientists? One 
version of this alternative holds that survey responses about 
climate change and climate scientists behave as indicators for 
the same thing (Kahan, 2015).
Although Gauchat’s (2012) GSS analysis finds liberal/
conservative divisions on general confidence in “the scien-
tific community,” it remains obvious that not all science is 
uniformly opposed by conservatives. McCright, Dentzman, 
Charters, and Dietz (2013) apply Schnaiberg’s (1977, 1980) 
distinction between impact science, which could highlight 
negative externalities from economic activities, and produc-
tion science, which aims to enhance economic production. 
They find, as expected, that conservatives are more inclined 
to oppose impact science and favor production science. The 
impact/production distinction, however, applies less well to 
other domains such as human evolution that are not eco-
nomic, but nevertheless marked by strong partisan divisions 
(Hamilton & Saito, 2015). Seeking a broad measure for trust 
in science that is not domain-specific, Nadelson et al. (2014) 
construct a 21-item index which proves to be positively 
related to liberalism and negatively to religiosity. Kahan 
(2015), however, shows it is possible to build indexes for 
science intelligence and climate science intelligence by 
choosing a balance of questions alternately biased against 
liberals or conservatives. A trust in science index that is not 
politically correlated might be assembled with offsetting-
bias items, but its interpretation would be difficult compared 
with individual questions addressing specific, high-salience 
science domains.
Indirect support for symmetry—conservative rejection of 
science in some domains balanced by liberal rejection in 
others—comes from experiments including Kahan (2013), 
who reports that liberal and conservative opinions about the 
validity of a three-question cognitive test vary in opposite 
directions depending on whether subjects are told that people 
who accept (or in alternate forms, reject) evidence of climate 
change tend to do better on this test. More directly, Campbell 
and Kay (2014) describe solution aversion in which people 
doubt the seriousness of a scientifically identified problem 
because they object to its likely solutions. Climate change 
provides the archetype for such aversion: Conservative skep-
ticism of consensus statements from climate scientists is 
reduced when a free-market solution is proposed, while lib-
eral views remain unchanged. Two other experiments (react-
ing to scientific statements about climate change and the 
health effects of air pollution) further show solution aversion 
among conservatives but not among liberals. To find solution 
aversion among liberals, they run a fourth experiment in 
which subjects read essays arguing for or against gun control 
as a solution to home invasions; those who favor gun control 
are more likely to discount the seriousness of this problem if 
relaxed gun controls are presented as the solution. Unlike 
climate change or pollution, however, this gun control 
manipulation does not reference a broad scientific consensus 
that exists in real life.
Vaccinations, however, clearly are a domain with strong 
scientific and medical consensus. Claims of disproportion-
ately liberal bias against vaccinations have been widely 
repeated, but so far with little empirical support. Kahan 
(2014) detects no significant political or religious differences 
in vaccine risk perceptions. Lewandowsky et al. (2013) con-
struct an indicator of attitudes toward vaccination and find 
that opposition is predicted most strongly by conspiracist 
ideation (tendency to believe in conspiracies), secondarily 
by a free-market ideology, and most weakly by liberalism. A 
strong correlation (.85) between their free-market and lib-
eral/conservative dimensions suggests caution, however. 
Collinearity might complicate interpretation of their oppo-
site-sign partial effects. Other factors such as age, gender, 
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and education are not controlled in this analysis nor in sev-
eral reports that note political differences in response to sur-
vey questions about vaccines (Berinsky, 2012; Pew, 2009).
Two Regional Surveys
To test the opposite-bias proposition, we use similarly 
worded survey questions asking whether people trust scien-
tists for information about climate change or about vaccines. 
These questions were placed on random-sample surveys 
conducted in New Hampshire and northeast Oregon in 2014.
Our Oregon survey focused on seven rural counties in the 
historically resource-dependent northeast corner of the state, 
whereas the New Hampshire survey was statewide. Both 
aimed for representative sampling within their respective 
regions, although New Hampshire encompasses a greater 
diversity of urban to rural locations and is somewhat closer to 
representative for the United States as a whole. Previous sur-
veys have found that New Hampshire residents give responses 
similar to those on national surveys with respect to climate 
change and some other environmental issues (Hamilton, 
2012), whereas northeast Oregon responses tend to be more 
conservative (Hamilton et al., 2014; Hamilton et al., 2012). 
The geographic, cultural, and socioeconomic distance between 
these two regions provides a challenge for replication.
Telephone interviews for both surveys were conducted by 
trained interviewers at the Survey Center of the University of 
New Hampshire in summer and fall 2014. The surveys 
occurred under two different projects:
New Hampshire (Granite State Poll)
This random-sample land line and cell telephone survey of 
1,061 New Hampshire residents took place in two stages, in 
July and October 2014.1 The Granite State Poll interviews 
random samples of New Hampshire residents 4 times each 
year. Along with standard background and political ques-
tions, the poll carries questions on climate change and other 
science-related topics (Hamilton, 2012; Hamilton & Saito, 
2015).
Northeast Oregon (Communities and Forests in 
Oregon [CAFOR])
A random-sample land line and cell telephone survey of 
1,752 residents in seven counties (Baker, Crook, Grant, 
Umatilla, Union, Wallowa, Wheeler) was conducted under 
the CAFOR project in August through October 2014 (Boag 
et al., 2015).2 Earlier, CAFOR research has been described in 
papers or reports by Hamilton et al. (2012; Hamilton et al., 
2014) and Hartter et al. (2014; Hartter et al., 2015).
The Oregon survey, conducted in a rural region where the 
forest industry and fire risks are salient topics, also asked a 
third parallel question concerning trust in scientists as a 
source of information about forest management issues. The 
wording of these trust questions, along with others used in 
our analysis, is given in Table 1. Table 1 also lists coding for 
the logit regression analysis of Table 2.
All analyses in this article use probability weights to make 
minor adjustments for known sampling bias. Although 
weighting schemes designed by CAFOR and Granite State 
Poll researchers differ in their details, they have similar 
goals. We use each project’s original weights here to main-
tain consistency with other published analyses.
Surveys commonly assess political orientation by asking 
respondents to self-identify their ideology or political party. 
Ideological questions might use as many as nine values, from 
“extremely liberal” to “extremely conservative,” or be 
Table 1. Definitions of Variables, With Weighted Means or Percentages From Surveys in Northeast OR (1,752 Interviews in August to 
October 2014) and NH (1,061 Interviews in July or October 2014).
Independent variables
Age—Respondent’s age in years (18 to 96; OR = 50 years, NH = 48 years).
Gender—Male (0) or female (1; OR = 51%, NH = 51%).
Education—High school or less (–1; OR = 28%, NH = 20%), some college or technical school (0; OR = 32%, NH = 26%), college 
graduate (1; OR = 26%, NH = 34%), or postgraduate (2; OR = 14%, NH = 20%).
Party—Democrat (–1; OR = 23%, NH = 38%), Independent (0; OR = 16%, NH = 20%), Republican (1; OR = 31%, NH = 23%), or Tea 
Party supporter (2; OR = 29%, NH = 20%).
Dependent variables
Vaccine—Would you say that you trust (1; OR = 57%, NH = 70%), don’t trust (0; OR = 18%, NH = 11%), or are unsure (0; OR = 25%, 
NH = 20%) about scientists as a source of information about vaccines?
Climate—Would you say that you trust (1; OR = 44%, NH = 63%), don’t trust (0; OR = 28%, NH = 14%), or are unsure (0; OR = 27%, 
NH = 23%) about scientists as a source of information about climate change?
Forest—Oregon only: Would you say that you trust (1; OR = 44%), don’t trust (0; OR = 44%), or are unsure (0; OR = 30%) about 
scientists as a source of information about forest management issues.
Climvax—Coded 1 if respondent does not indicate trust in scientists regarding either climate change or vaccines (i.e., climvax = 1 if vaccine = 
0 and climate = 0; OR = 33%, NH = 20%).
Note. Codes shown are those used for regressions in Table 2. OR = Oregon; NH = New Hampshire.
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simplified to just five or three. Similarly, a U.S. political party 
question might range from “strong Democrat” to “strong 
Republican,” or be simplified to Democrat, Independent, or 
Republican (in each case, with a residual “other” category that 
is often too diverse to interpret). Although historical research 
regarded ideology and party as distinct dimensions, societal 
trends toward increasing polarization and party sorting (where 
people choose parties that align with their ideology) have 
strengthened the correlation between ideological and party 
measures (Fiorina & Abrams, 2008; Guber, 2012; McCright 
et al., 2014), so they behave similarly in relation to other sur-
vey questions. For example, both ideology and political party 
questions, in either seven-value or three-value forms, exhibit 
strong and consistent effects on beliefs about climate change: 
Liberals or Democrats are much more likely than conserva-
tives or Republicans to agree with the scientific consensus that 
anthropogenic climate change is real and problematic (e.g., 
Hamilton, 2011, 2012; McCright & Dunlap, 2011).
Both of our regional surveys asked respondents to self-
identify as Democrat, Republican, or Independent. They also 
separately inquired whether they support, oppose, or are neu-
tral regarding “the political movement known as the Tea 
Party,” which in recent years has become a prominent, 
strongly conservative force in U.S. politics. Hamilton and 
Saito (2015) develop these two questions into a four-party 
classification of Democrats, Independents, Republicans, and 
Tea Party supporters (whatever their initial party identifica-
tion).3 Responses to many science, environmental, or politi-
cal questions show a strong, ordered gradient from Democrat 
to Independent to Republican to Tea Party supporter using 
this scheme. Comparing our two regional surveys, the north-
east Oregon sample appears substantially more conservative, 
consistent with recent voting in that region.4 We also see that 
northeast Oregon respondents are several years older than 
those in New Hampshire and less likely to have college or 
postgraduate degrees.
Dependent variables for this analysis are three questions 
about trust in scientists. Does the respondent trust scientists 
as a source of information about vaccines? About climate 
change? Or, in northeast Oregon, about forest management 
issues? Alternatively, do they not trust scientists, or are they 
unsure? A similar question about trust in scientists for infor-
mation on environmental issues was asked previously on 
national, regional, and statewide surveys (Hamilton, 2014; 
Hamilton et al., 2012; Hamilton & Saito, 2015). Our vaccine 
version was introduced as an experiment in 2014.
In principle, one might think such questions are ambigu-
ous, because people of any persuasion could believe at least 
some scientists are trustworthy and support their own posi-
tion. In practice, however, research finds that many 
responses follow attitudes regarding the domain itself—so 
much so that perceptions about the risks of climate change 
and the trustworthiness of climate scientists, for example, 
arguably behave as if they are indicators for the same thing 
(Kahan, 2015). Similarly, responses on trusting scientists 
for information about environmental issues have mostly the 
same predictors as belief in anthropogenic climate change 
or support for environmental protection (Hamilton & Saito, 
2015).
Who Trusts Scientists?
Figure 1 graphs response to our climate, vaccines, and for-
estry trust questions. On both surveys, a majority say they 
trust scientists about vaccines, although this majority is 
larger in New Hampshire (70% vs. 57%). Climate change, 
often a polarizing topic, evinces less trust on both surveys 
(63% vs. 44%). In northeast Oregon where the forest man-
agement question was asked, it brought responses similar to 
climate change (44% trust scientists). Forest management 
and science in this region are probably associated in many 
people’s minds with environmental protection or the U.S. 
Forest Service. Both our 2011 and 2014 northeast Oregon 
surveys found widespread doubts about local impacts from 
environmental rules. They also found concerns that the 
Forest Service is not doing enough, or not doing the right 
Table 2. Odds Ratios From Weighted Logit Regression of Trust in Scientists Regarding Vaccines, Climate Change, or Forest 
Management, in Northeast OR or NH.
Vaccine Climate Forest Climvax
 OR NH OR NH OR OR NH
Age 0.998 1.001 0.974*** 0.981** 0.976*** 1.011* 1.007
Gender 1.127 0.735 1.258 0.983 1.066 0.813 1.665*
Education 1.781*** 1.441*** 1.654*** 1.439*** 1.800*** 0.548*** 0.716**
Party 0.786** 0.657*** 0.489*** 0.521*** 0.610*** 1.491*** 2.014***
Education × Party 0.889 0.855* 0.841* 0.693*** 0.863* 1.164* 1.232*
Constant 1.567 2.615 3.798 5.015 3.265 0.234 0.107
Estimation 
sample
1,552 962 1,552 962 1,552 1,552 962
Note. OR = Oregon; NH = New Hampshire.
*p < .05. **p < .01. ***p < .001.
6 SAGE Open
things, to manage forests that have great importance for local 
landscapes and livelihoods.
Education and political orientation, two individual char-
acteristics that often predict views on science, do so consis-
tently in our data as well. Figure 2 graphs the percentage of 
“trust-scientists” responses by education, across two surveys 
and three questions. In all five charts, trust is highest among 
those with postgraduate education and lowest among respon-
dents with high school or less. Overall levels of trust tend to 
be lower in northeast Oregon, but education gradients there 
are steeper. Among Oregon respondents with high school or 
less education, fewer than half (34%-41%) trust scientists on 
vaccines, climate change, or forest management. Among 
New Hampshire residents with high school or less, more 
than half (53%-58%) trust scientists on vaccines or climate.
Political orientation has been shown to be a consistent 
predictor for indicators of trust in scientists generally 
(McCright et al., 2013) or more specifically regarding envi-
ronmental issues (Hamilton & Saito, 2015). It proves simi-
larly consistent as a predictor of the three domain-specific 
trust questions here. Figure 3 breaks down trust-scientist 
responses by political party. For both surveys and all three 
questions, trust is highest among Democrats and lowest 
among Tea Party supporters.5 Regarding climate change, that 
pattern agrees with all previous research. The northeast 
Oregon forest management result is unsurprising as well. 
Science on forest management in that region has often been 
associated not only with government but also with environ-
mental or endangered-species protection—examples of 
impact science (McCright et al., 2013; Schnaiberg, 1977, 
1980) and grounds for conservative solution aversion 
(Campbell & Kay, 2014). However, neither impact science 
nor solution aversion theories predict that trust regarding 
vaccines would be greater among Democrats (75% or 82%) 
compared with Tea Party supporters (51% or 52%). This 
result contradicts claims of a liberal anti-science bias on 
vaccines.
The bivariate trust/party relationships in Figure 3, like the 
trust/education relationships in Figure 2, all are statistically sig-
nificant (p < .05, from design-based F tests). Other background 
Figure 1. Weighted percentages for three “trust scientists” questions on New Hampshire and NE Oregon surveys.
Note. NE = Northeast.
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characteristics such as age and gender often correlate with edu-
cation or party, however, raising the question of whether rela-
tionships in these charts might partly be spurious. Moreover, 
education and political party often exhibit interaction effects 
that make additive models misleading. The next section tests 
these ideas.
Interaction Effects
Survey research on climate change perceptions often detects 
interaction effects involving education and politics, the two 
key variables noted above. Education exhibits positive 
effects on perceptions about the reality or risk of 
anthropogenic climate change among liberals and moderates 
(or Democrats and Independents) but a weak or even nega-
tive effect among conservatives (or Republicans). First 
observed in GSS data by Hamilton (2008), education × poli-
tics interactions were subsequently confirmed using other 
climate questions and surveys (Hamilton, 2011, 2012; 
Hamilton & Keim, 2009; McCright, 2011; McCright & 
Dunlap, 2011; Shao, Keim, Garland, & Hamilton, 2014). 
Variations with a similar flavor include objectively tested 
science literacy × politics (Hamilton et al., 2012), numerical 
literacy × worldview (Kahan et al., 2012), and self-assessed 
understanding × politics (Hamilton, 2011; McCright & 
Dunlap, 2011).
Studies have also found similar interactions regarding a 
number of non-climate environmental questions (Hamilton, 
Colocousis, & Duncan, 2010; Hamilton et al., 2014; Hamilton 
& Safford, 2015). For example, Hamilton and Saito (2015) 
report education × party interactions affecting not only cli-
mate measures but also belief in human evolution and 
whether people say they trust scientists for information about 
environmental issues. We expected to see such interactions 
regarding trust in scientists on climate change. Theory does 
not predict, and previous studies have not tested, whether 
similar interactions might occur regarding trust in scientists 
on vaccines.
The general pattern of the education × politics (and simi-
lar) interactions fits with several overlapping theoretical 
Figure 2. Weighted percentage who trust scientists, by education.
Note. HS = high school; NE = Northeast.
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frameworks, notably biased assimilation (Corner, 
Whitmarsh, & Xenias, 2011; Munro & Ditto, 1997) and elite 
cues (Brulle et al., 2012; McCright et al., 2014). A common 
theme in these frameworks is selective acquisition of infor-
mation that supports existing prejudices, whether from peer 
groups, political leaders, news media, or other sources. 
General news media often provide “balanced” coverage 
from which ideologically agreeable information can be fil-
tered (Boykoff, 2013). Alternatively, information can be pre-
filtered by choosing biased web or media sources. To account 
for the Education × Politics interaction effects, a common 
inference has been that information elites can be more effica-
cious in biased assimilation or perceiving elite cues. That is, 
they more actively acquire information to reinforce their 
ideological beliefs.
Table 2 shows results from seven models including edu-
cation × party interaction effects on trust in scientists about 
vaccines, climate change, or forest management, separately 
for the Oregon and New Hampshire surveys. The last two 
columns depict the composite dependent variable climvax, 
denoting individuals who do not say they trust scientists on 
either climate change or vaccines. All models also include 
respondent age and gender as control variables.6 The coeffi-
cients shown are odds ratios from weighted logit regressions. 
They represent the multiplicative effects of a one-unit 
increase in each independent variable on the odds favoring a 
“trust-scientists” response (or for the last two columns, the 
lack of trust in scientists).7 Thus, for the northeast Oregon 
survey, each 1-year increase in respondent age multiplies the 
odds of trusting scientists for information about vaccines by 
0.998 (a 0.2% change), which is trivial and not significant. 
Age does have significant effects on trust regarding climate 
change or forest management. In each case, older respon-
dents are less inclined to trust scientists. Gender shows a sig-
nificant effect only on climvax, in New Hampshire.
The main effects of education describe the effects of edu-
cation when party = 0, that is among political Independents. 
These education main effects are statistically significant 
across all seven models, indicating that among Independents, 
the odds of trusting scientists about vaccines, climate, or for-
est management increase (multiplied by 1.439 to 1.800, that 
is, rise by about 44% to 80%) with each level of education. 
Figure 3. Weighted percentage who trust scientists, by political party.
Note. NE = Northeast.
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The odds of not trusting scientists on either vaccines or cli-
mate decline with education.
Political party main effects likewise are significant across 
all trust questions and both surveys. For the positively coded 
questions in columns 1 to 5 (Table 2), these odds ratios are all 
below 1.0, meaning the odds of a “trust scientist for informa-
tion” response declines moving from Democrat to 
Independent, Republican, and Tea Party supporter. In the 
Oregon survey, for example, odds of trusting scientists about 
vaccines decline by an average of 21% (are multiplied by 
0.786) with each level of party. In the New Hampshire sur-
vey, odds of trusting scientists about vaccines decline by 
34% (multiplied by 0.657) with each level of party. Both 
results contradict assertions that liberals are more likely to 
reject science regarding vaccines; instead, the opposite is 
true. Party effects are even stronger regarding climate 
change, where each level reduces the odds of trusting scien-
tists for information by an average of 51% (northeast Oregon) 
or 48% (New Hampshire).8
The education × party interaction terms are statistically 
significant across six of our seven models and take the same 
direction in all. Education exerts the strongest positive effect 
on trust among Democrats and a somewhat weaker but still 
positive effect among Independents. Among Republicans and 
Tea Party supporters, education effects are closer to zero. 
Figure 4 visualizes these relationships with adjusted marginal 
plots calculated from the first five logit models of Table 2. 
Among Tea Party supporters, trust in scientists regarding cli-
mate change actually declines with education, consistent with 
results in Hamilton and Saito (2015) that used a different cli-
mate question and a categorical rather than ordinal party 
indicator.
The other interactions in Figure 4 are weaker but have the 
same direction. Trust in scientists on each topic rises steeply 
with education among Democrats and Independents, and 
rises less steeply or not at all with education among Tea Party 
supporters. The replications in Figure 4 extend the domains 
over which we have seen political divisions widening with 
Figure 4. Interaction effects: Predicted probability of trust in scientists as a function of education and political party, controlling for age 
and gender.
Note. HS = high school; NE = Northeast.
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education, to now include trust in scientists about forest 
management and vaccines. Biased assimilation, elite cues, 
and similar theories account for such patterns (regarding cli-
mate change, for example) in terms of more effective and 
motivated acquisition of information. With respect to vac-
cines, this might, depending on one’s prejudices, go in one 
direction toward greater awareness of medical studies and 
advice or in the opposite direction toward anti-vaccination 
sources such as the websites described by Brown et al. (2012) 
or Kata (2012). In both directions, such motivated informa-
tion-seeking has analogues on the topic of climate change.
What is the demographic profile of those who do not trust 
scientists on either of our two main questions? We explored 
this in Table 2 by defining a new variable, climvax, denoting 
those respondents who do not trust scientists on climate 
change and do not trust them on vaccines. This untrustful 
group comprises one third of our Oregon sample and one 
fifth of those from New Hampshire. The last two columns in 
Table 2 show that this composite indicator for lack of trust 
has dominant political effects that mirror those for the vac-
cine, climate, and forest indicators individually. Democrats 
are least likely and Tea Party supporters most likely not to 
trust scientists on either vaccines or climate change. We also 
see significant education × party interaction effects on 
climvax that mirror those for the individual indicators: The 
odds of trusting scientists on neither vaccines nor climate 
change decline most steeply with education among 
Democrats and decline less steeply (northeast Oregon) or 
actually increase (New Hampshire) with education among 
Tea Party supporters.
Discussion
New Hampshire and northeast Oregon differ in many ways, 
so finding common patterns across both surveys suggests the 
conclusions are robust. The common patterns involve higher 
liberal and lower conservative trust in scientists, something 
already well documented regarding climate change (e.g., 
Campbell & Kay, 2014; McCright & Dunlap, 2011) and 
environmental issues (Hamilton, 2014; Hamilton & Saito, 
2015; McCright et al., 2013). Unexpectedly, we find that this 
occurs also with vaccines, a topic where stereotypically lib-
eral arguments exist (e.g., concern about chemicals and big 
corporations), and some observers have claimed to see the 
liberal counterpart to conservative rejection of climate sci-
ence. Our contrary finding brings up a question raised by 
others: Are conservatives generally less inclined to trust sci-
entists? Mooney (2005, 2012), drawing on ideological, eco-
nomic, psychological, and even physiological studies, has 
argued in the affirmative. Other studies reporting higher lib-
eral or lower conservative support for science include 
Gauchat’s (2012) analysis of a general GSS question and 
work by Nadelson et al. (2014) on a multi-item scale.
Narrowing their focus to bias regarding specific science 
domains, McCright et al. (2013) find patterns consistent with 
theoretical predictions involving impact science versus pro-
duction science; Campbell and Kay (2014) propose a some-
what overlapping theory of solution aversion. Both theories 
fit our climate change and forest management results, but 
neither fits our finding on vaccines. The impact versus pro-
duction theory predicts that conservatives should favor sci-
ence that serves economic needs, which vaccine research 
does both for pharmaceutical companies and public health.
Solution aversion suggests that skepticism toward science 
is motivated by aversion to ideologically objectionable solu-
tions such as pollution control, but that does not match the 
vaccination case either. Adverse reactions to vaccines are 
objectionable to everyone regardless of ideology and, cer-
tainly, to physicians and medical scientists; they are the focus 
of studies and conclusions in the IOM (2012) report, for 
example. A more ideological conservative objection could be 
that vaccinations often involve government (Salmon et al., 
2005), although anti-vaccination rhetoric has mainly empha-
sized child safety (Brayden & Wall, 2008; Kirkland, 2012). 
There might also be connections through Lewandowsky 
et al.’s (2013) idea of conspiracist ideation, not testable with 
our data but needing further research in this framework.
Our surveys do not ask whether people think that vaccines 
are safe. With regard to specific vaccines, that is a topic of past 
and continuing research. The surveys ask whether people think 
that scientists can be trusted for information on this topic. 
Democrats are most likely, and Tea Party supporters least 
likely, to say yes. This political pattern in vaccine and climate 
change responses, despite the much different content and con-
cerns in those domains, appears consistent with hypotheses of 
broader ideological divisions on acceptance of science. 
Behavior of our combined indicator for who does not trust sci-
entists on either domain points in this direction as well.
The pattern of liberal trust and conservative distrust of 
science appears broad in that it extends across many domains, 
to which we now add vaccines. Further domains need testing 
in future research, but even if those follow the same pattern, 
it would not necessarily imply divergent attitudes toward 
“science” as a general abstraction. More concretely, the 
observed patterns show divergent views regarding scientific 
evidence in areas that have a strong consensus among scien-
tists, but where public divisions exist and ideology may sup-
ply different answers.
Authors’ Note
Conclusions in this article are those of the authors and do not neces-
sarily represent the views of supporting agencies. Sampling and 
interviews for both surveys were conducted by the University of 
New Hampshire (UNH) Survey Center. Suggestions by three anon-
ymous reviewers contributed to final draft.
Declaration of Conflicting Interests
The author(s) declared no potential conflicts of interest with 
respect to the research, authorship, and/or publication of this 
article.
Hamilton et al. 11
Funding
The author(s) disclosed receipt of the following financial support for 
the research and/or authorship of this article: The Communities and 
Forests in Oregon (CAFOR) project is supported by the Agricultural 
and Food Research Initiative, U.S. Department of Agriculture 
(2014-68002-21782). General science and environmental questions 
on the Granite State Poll are carried out through the New Hampshire 
EPSCoR project, supported by the U.S. National Science Foundation 
(EPS-1101245) and by the Carsey School of Public Policy and the 
Sustainability Institute at the University of New Hampshire (UNH).
Notes
1. Response rates of 24% and 22%, by the American Association 
for Public Opinion Research (AAPOR; 2006) definition 4.
2. Response rate 33%, by the AAPOR (2006) definition 4.
3. People who declined to answer either political question are set 
aside for these analyses.
4. For example, in 2012, President Obama received from 22.1% 
to 34.5% of the votes cast in these northeast Oregon (OR) 
counties, compared with 52.2% in the state of New Hampshire 
(NH) and 51.1% nationwide.
5. Separating out Tea Party supporters builds a fourth political 
group consisting of 2% (OR) or 9% (NH) of those who origi-
nally self-identified as Democrats; 7% (OR) or 17% (NH) of 
Independents; 38% (OR) or 40% (NH) of Republicans; and 
30% (OR) or 19% (NH) of those who originally self-identi-
fied as “other” or gave no affiliation. Using just Democrat/
Independent/Republican instead of our four-party scheme con-
sequently would have little impact (two points or less) on any 
of the Democrat percentages in Figure 3. With either coding, 
Democrats are most likely to trust scientists on all measures in 
both surveys. Three-party coding also would have little impact 
on the Independent percentages of Figure 3: two points or less 
regarding vaccines or climate and four points regarding for-
est management. Under a three-party coding, the Republican 
percentages become intermediate between Republican and Tea 
Party percentages shown in Figure 3. However, combining this 
heterogeneous group overlooks what are often wide and politi-
cally consequential differences between Tea Party and non-Tea 
Party Republicans (Hamilton, 2014; Hamilton & Saito, 2015).
6. McCright et al. (2013) report that religious identification also 
affects trust in science. We looked for a similar pattern in our 
New Hampshire data using a standard question about fre-
quency of religious service attendance but that proved to have 
no effect on climate or vaccine responses. A religion question 
was not asked on our Oregon survey.
7. The first five models in Table 2 use dichotomous dependent 
variables, coded 1 if the respondent says they trust scientists 
and 0 otherwise. Alternatively, these survey questions can 
be coded as ordinal (distrust/unsure/trust) and analyzed by 
ordered logit regression. Ordered-logit versions yield basi-
cally the same conclusions as the binomial models in Table 2, 
however. For parsimony, we prefer the dichotomous versions 
in Table 2.
8. Our four-value political party indicator is treated as ordinal in 
these models, but we also tested versions with party treated 
categorically as a set of dummy variables (see Hamilton & 
Saito, 2015, for examples using the latter approach). Both ver-
sions yield similar conclusions. Because our substantive focus 
in this article is on the liberal-to-conservative gradient rather 
than contrasts between individual party pairs, we prefer the 
simpler ordinal approach here.
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